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Book Review: Raymond Challinor, A Radical Lawyer in Victorian England: W. P.
Roberts and the Struggle for Workers' Rights (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1990)
17 Victorian Review, Spring, 1991, 99-106.1

Raymond Challinor's book A Radical Lawyer in Victorian England is fine
biography. His subject, W. P. Roberts, was closely involved in the work-place and
democratic struggles of ordinary working people between 1837 and 1871 - years
which encompass the rise and fall of Chartism, the breaking of the Bond, battles
against truck, the emergence of trade unionism, the Fenian troubles. The book is
more than biography for it is also a study of each of these. More importantly perhaps
Challinor draws attention to an issue which has been much overlooked in nineteenth
Century history: the social role and functions of LAW.
The author's preface indicates that one motivation for writing the book was to
"deal with the methods used by the state - many of them employed right down to the
present day - to defeat, or tame, working class movements" (vii). The methods of
state, of course, are only aberrationally violent. More routinely "it" acts through and
in turn is constituted by law, lawyers, judges, magistrates, adjudication, court orders,
"contractual" arrangements, or unexceptional prohibitions of "anti-social" behaviour.
While the use of soldiers, special constables, militia, police, and agents provocateurs
in the suppression of nineteenth century working-class politics cannot be denied, the
more mundane, pervasive, and ambivalent workings of the legal system remain
virtually unexplored territories.
There are some obvious explanations for this. Historians are often intimidated
by the procedures and languages of law and are immobilized when confronted with
legal materials (little realizing that nineteenth century law is often just as foreign to
those who have experienced formal legal education): far easier to interpret the more
familiar discourses of Hansard, Parliamentary Journals, broadsheets and political
pamphlets. In addition to being unfamiliar, the primary records of the legal system
are vast, largely unindexed, scattered, and unsystematically maintained. Often no
records have survived of matters which are of interest to the historian; revealing
gems are found - if at all - buried in mountains of seemingly useless crumbling
parchment. The search is extraordinarily time-consuming, the more so because the
social historian is concerned with "law in action" rather than with the written words
of Parliament or the published judgments of Superior Courts. Mining the multiple
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social meanings of law calls for careful attention to the proceedings of a multitude of
local level courts - precisely where records are most difficult to access. Work of this
sort can only be conducted with an army of research assistants or at a pace likely to
leave the scholar well behind in the race for academic appointment, tenure, or
promotion. (Challinor worked on this book for some twenty years - vii.)
Moreover, the study of the legal system in operation has until very recent times
been unfashionable. It necessarily involves a study of the "middling" classes who
actually worked as attorneys or barristers and has neither the traditional allure of
kings, queens and statesmen nor the trendier appeal of heroically reclaiming the lives
of working class heroines and heroes. While there has latterly been increasing
recognition of the need to direct attention to the middling classes, their role continues
to be generally under-acknowledged by both those who would study history of the
"top" down and social historians working "from the bottom up."
A Radical Lawyer in Victorian England makes a considerable contribution to
filling this gap in historical knowledge and is suggestive of avenues of inquiry that
need to be taken up by others. Challinor's subject is an extraordinary historical
figure. Admitted to the lower branch of the legal profession2 in Bath in 1827 W. P.
Roberts converted from Toryism in the first decade of his professional life to emerge
as a leading figure in the Bath Working Men's Association by 1837 (5). Apparently
motivated by a deeply-held Christian belief in an essential human dignity, (6-7, 211)
Roberts' consistently employed the law as a shield in the defence of working people,
a platform from which to denounce injustice, a prod with which to encourage
collective action, and a weapon with which to bludgeon the perpetrators of injustice.
Variously he was a local activist in Bath and Wiltshire (1837-), delegate to Chartist
conventions, political prisoner, solicitor to Karl Marx, lawyer for the
Northumberland and Durham miners' county unions (1843), and lawyer for the
Lancashire Miner's Association (1845-).
Roberts seemed always to be near the centre of crucial events in the Victorian
making of the English working class - he confronted physical force Toryism,
defended those accused in the Newport uprising (1839), and was a central figure in
the 1842 Potteries general strike. He was present for the wire-rope controversy at
Wingate grange colliery, the Thornley colliery trials, Northumberland and Durham
coalfields "big strike" of 1844, the Jones and Potts strike of 1846 and the legal
aftermaths of explosions at Haswell and Coxlodge collieries. Roberts was active in
the formation of the National Association of United Trades, the Miner's Union, and
various friendly society and co-operative endeavours. He published pamphlets on
2
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legal and political issues, worked on the Chartist petitions to Parliament, and on one
occasion stood for election himself. He was present in the aftermath of the
Kennington Common demonstration and, worked for Karl Marx in his libel action
against Herr Vogt. Roberts conducted the notorious Blaina trial in South Wales and
published 10,000 copies of the transcript in an important part of the war against
truck. He was attorney for the Manchester martyrs in 1867 and for those accused in
the Clerkenwell prison explosion prosecutions. Roberts was instrumental in aiding
the Wearmouth colliery workers to smash the hated Bond in 1869.
Challinor treats the beginning of Roberts full-time work on union matters as a
watershed in English legal history:
By becoming the legal adviser to the Northumberland and Durham
miners' county unions in August 1843, Roberts took a historically
unprecedented step. Hitherto the law and all its works had been regarded as
enemy territory by workers; only when arraigned before a court for
punishment did they come into contact with it. To try to alter this situation systematically using the judicial system both to defend workers and as a
vehicle to claim their legal rights - was unheard of before Roberts began his
struggle. (71)
While this assessment may be somewhat overstated - there certainly had been
radical lawyers willing to act in working class causes prior to 1843 - it does
emphasize the novelty of a major worker's organization engaging in a focused,
sustained, and multi-faceted court-room strategy.
The visions of law, legality, and progressive legal practice which informed
Roberts working life are noteworthy. He consistently eschewed the role of a legal
technician in favour of more direct confrontation with the political realities
underlying Victorian legal ordering. In Challinor's assessment, Roberts consistently
"sought to speak through the courtroom window, combining the legal struggle with
the struggle in the political arena." (11) In Robert's advocacy, "class conflict was reenacted inside and outside the courtroom, the collision of two worlds with different
outlooks and values" (80) and the courtroom forum was deliberately employed to
communicate incendiary messages to larger audiences. Union bosses might seek to
calm things down when industrial unrest arose in the coalfields but Roberts would
"spread the fire, dousing the whole coalfield with paraffin, if he thought this could
force his enemy to surrender. He regarded the courts as a battleground, where he
used the law as a weapon, belabouring the coal owner until `he bit the dust.'" (253)
Despite his commitment to advocacy, Roberts was never so naive as to think
of the courtroom as a neutral arena in which the democratic discourses of the
working class might be impartially assessed and thereby enter peaceably into the
discourses of state. He considered the police "a plague of blue locusts" (quoted at
81) and thought no better of judges and juries. These individuals, he said, "live by

the plunder of the present system" and therefore could be expected to oppose
progressive movement (25-26). Roberts thought magistrates and special juries to be
class partisans pure-and-simple (68, 78, 79, 255-256). Even judges who were honest
enough to rise above mere political hackery were, he wrote, individuals whose entire
tendencies and circumstances are against [the working class].... And
there are hundreds of other considerations - meetings, political councils,
intermarriages, hopes from wills, etc.... it certainly is, at best, an uphill game to
contend in favour of the working man in a question which admits of any doubt
against him." (quoted at 80).
In addition to all this the extraordinary costs of litigation, employers ability to blacklist troublesome workers, the unequal distribution of knowledge about the law, and
the consistent ability of the privileged to act in concert in the face of crisis conspired
to make the judicial forum a singularly unequal place (240-242; 265-266). All in all,
Challinor contends, the legal system amounted to a "judicial juggernaut" which
ruthlessly "rode over working people" (59).
If the courtroom players were biased, the substantive rules of law offered no
solace. In an insightful chapter entitled "The Victorian Working Class and the Law"
(71-86) Challinor presents a class instrumentalist account of law in nineteenth
century England. Explicit class legislation was buttressed with nominally equitable
rules which in fact censured only working-class activity. The whole was
underpinned by doctrines of "private" law which ensured the subjugation of workers
("the hangman's noose was being replaced by Adam Smith's hidden hand" - 85).
Unemployment, starvation, the workhouse, gaol and police were, in Challinor's view,
part of a whole cloth (85). Where statute proved ineffective, judge-made common
law could be relied upon to repress trade unionists (75).
While so brief a summary fails to fully communicate the subtlety of
Challinor's account he does, I think, present too one-sided a vision of law - even in
the self-consciously hierarchical society which was Victorian Britain. There is little
sense here of genuine reform accomplishments, of the glacial creep of political
democracy, of the real gains achieved by progressive legislation - or indeed of the
possibility that legal formation occurs in complex, evolving, unpredictable patterns.
Nonetheless, the LAW was rightly viewed as a daunting opponent by Roberts and,
perhaps, by the bulk of his working-class constituency.
Given that judges and magistrates were biased, legal rules unfair, and juries
stacked it is intriguing that Roberts and the workers he represented chose to devote
considerable efforts in the courts rather than working directly and more fully in the
political arena. In part the answer is simply that they had no choice: courts were
routinely used to punish workers - defensive action was necessary. Beyond this, it
was thought that the legal arena should not be abandoned entirely to the other side.

Following the repression of Trowbridge Chartism in 1839 Roberts indicated his
views on working-class legal practice:
it would be wrong, he contended, to retreat from the legal arena, leaving
their opponents in undisputed control. Rather, they should fight court cases,
using them as an opportunity to expose the evils of existing society and
thereby to advance the Chartist cause. (25-26)
Challinor's account places heavy emphasis on Roberts awareness of the symbolic, or
ideological, significance of law (25-26; 73; 79; 182-3; 266; 267-8).
The symbolism associated with the legal discourses of equality, due process,
majesty, mercy and justice is a double-edged sword. It is this that empowered
Roberts to engage in deliberately counter-hegemonic legal practice even before
crassly manipulated, hostile tribunals. One the one hand, Challinor asserts that the
primary "role of industrial law under capitalism" is to impose "acceptance of the
attitudes and values of the existing system... altering behaviour and perception of the
world" (182-3). Conversely, the disjunction between law in the books and law in
practice provided significant creative opportunities when workers as well as
employers had legal representation.
When the legislation upon which employers relied was made to appear
draconian this could foster disrespect for the law, aid in union recruitment, and
generally mobilize a subordinate population for political activity (79; 248; 267-268).
In the opposite situation, a legal victory by workers could undermine employer's
authority, erode their self-confidence, and provide positive encouragement for
worker's causes. Challinor's observation to this effect is perceptive:
more crucial than the actual law was what it was perceived to be: the
symbol of the law had more power than its substance. This played a large part
in determining behaviour, by giving assurance to those from the upper
echelons of society to assert their arrogance, whereas the legislation they cited
to justify their conduct did no such thing. Much of W. P. Roberts' job was to
prick this bubble of over-weaning self-confidence, based upon unwritten laws
that really were not laws at all. The heated courtroom exchanges frequently
occurred because he challenged the conception that, far from being impartial,
legal authority was simply there to buttress the employers' authority. (73)
All in all, Challinor's account of Roberts' legal career provides an insightful
analysis of the social roles of law in Victorian Britain. It is an extraordinarily wellgrounded piece of research which provides insights inaccessible both to mere
theorists and to lazier historians. Nevertheless there are, I think, some important
issues which are either inadequately dealt with or unaddressed in A Radical Lawyer
in Victorian England.
One such issue relates to Roberts' life as a lawyer. It is intriguing to speculate
as to what role, if any, he played in the corporate life of the attorney's profession,

what sort of personal and/or business relations he maintained with other solicitors,
how he worked with barristers, and so on. During most of the nineteenth Century the
English Bar routinely refused to admit individuals of radically democratic politics
and almost all cases of disciplinary disbarment during the first two-thirds of the
century were persons whose political orthodoxy was in doubt. Did the solicitor's
profession attempt to act in similarly repressive ways or did its looser institutional
structure make this impossible? Did other attorneys or barristers complain about
Roberts or in any way attempt to control his behaviour? Did, then, a unique
professional culture make it seem less necessary or less desirable to act against
deviants than was the case at the Bar? Did the tribunals before which Roberts
appeared themselves attempt to constrain his professional activities? These questions
relate directly not only to the historically fascinating question of the potential for
counter-hegemonic legal practice (if this phrase is not an oxymoron) but also to the
social construction of legal discourses, of legal knowledge and - ultimately - of law
itself. Because law is embodied in a profession these are crucial questions and it is a
pity (though not a strong criticism) that Challinor was unable to address them in this
book.
Similarly, other aspects of Roberts' life seem underdeveloped in this
professional biography. In particular, Challinor drops several strong hints that a key
element of Roberts world-view and in his political activism was his Christian faith
(6-7, 211). This is an intriguing dimension to the life of an individual who worked
for Marx, and who Engles praised effusively (87) in his classic work, The Condition
of the Working Class in England. The denominational affiliation of Roberts, his role
in church life and the visions of righteous struggle, dedicated service, suffering, and
community life to which he subscribed are fascinating issues which are left largely
unexplored in this book. The pursuit of such lines of enquiry promises to reveal
much about the social roles of religion in relation to hierarchy, economic
development, and class struggle.
At a conceptual level, perplexing problems arise with respect to the
relationship between Challinor's historical reconstruction and the quagmire which is
social theory. In accounting for Roberts' career the author relies on metaphors which
invoke, variously, notions of law as class instrumentalism, mystification theory (1823), relative autonomy (267-8), theory of ideology (25-26, 73), as well, perhaps, as
discourse theory (268). Probably Challinor would not wish to be accused of most perhaps any - of these things, but his historical interpretation does at various points
imply a range of such socio-theoretical explanations. While these threads are not
drawn together explicitly at any length the dominant tone is one which invokes
variously class instrumentalism or class struggle analysis. Generally, he tends
towards functionalism more than is currently fashionable and more, perhaps, than is
merited on the evidence (although, as has been observed in other contexts, it is hard

to avoid outright conspiracy theories when one's historical subject matter focuses on
treason, seditious libel, trades unions history, conspiracy laws, or prohibitions on
combinations or illegal oaths!
It would be churlish to conclude any review of this book on a critical note. It
is a fine piece of scholarship. Quibbles apart, A Radical Lawyer in Victorian
England is a tremendously valuable contribution to the understanding of an
important aspect of Victorian English society. There can be no argument with the
author's concluding comment that "there is a need for greater interest to be taken in
the legal system - the laws themselves, who operates them, and who benefits from
their operation." (268)

